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Sanctions
The military regime in Burma is responsible for serious human rights abuses, and a number of Western countries, notably the US and the EU, have imposed trade, financial and investment sanctions whose objective is to pressurize the regime into making essential political reforms, ensuring basic civil and political liberties and ending human rights abuses.
US sanctions, which have long included an arms embargo, were reaffirmed in 1997 under the Clinton administration and reinforced in 2003 under the Bush administration. The 2003 measures were renewed in 2006, and include a ban on new investment, a suspension of all Burmese imports to the US, restrictions on the use of the US Dollar as well as an asset freeze and visa ban on junta personnel. These measures enjoy strong bipartisan support in both Houses of Congress. There is no likelihood that they will be revoked any time soon, and they could even be strengthened.
EU sanctions are based on a “Common Position” worked out among the 25 EU member countries. They are more selective than US sanctions, and include an arms embargo, a visa ban and asset freeze similar to US measures, a limited investment ban on selected military-controlled enterprises, and denial of the General System of Preferences (GSP) available generally to 49 designated developing countries. EU sanctions are a necessary compromise between those who favour more stick than carrot, and those who wish to promote critical dialogue. As with the US, there is no likelihood that the EU “Common Position” will change any time soon.
Both the US and EU are opposed to the provision of funding for Burma from international financial institutions (IFIs) like the Asian Development Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the Asian Development Bank, though these institutions maintain a dialogue with the regime and recommend structural reforms to the ailing economy, notably a resolution of the multiple-exchange rate system, less Government intervention and greater control of corruption. However, without authority to provide refinancing and resources for structural reform, the IFIs cannot act and the economy continues to flounder.
Effectiveness of Sanctions
There is no evidence that, since sanctions were first applied in the aftermath of the uprising of 8 August 1988, they have had any measurable effect in influencing the regime to introduce serious political reform. There is some evidence that, on isolated occasions, they have induced the authorities to release this or that individual, or to make this or that minor concession, but as sanctions have been slowly ratcheted up, the regime has become more hard-line and more recalcitrant and less inclined to pay any intention to international concerns. US sanctions have undoubtedly inflicted some punishment on the economy generally, and though in the countryside the population has not been seriously affected, their living standards remain static as the regime takes resources from social welfare programmes, health and education to meet what is seen as the Western threat.
Western Governments, however, need to respond to domestic pressures from campaigning groups who demand that something should be done about human rights abuses. Sanctions express our moral outrage at the situation in Burma, send a strong message of support for Aung San Suu Kyi and the hundreds of political prisoners in Burma and ensure that their plight is not forgotten.
Our Policy
Voices for Burma fully support these sentiments, but doubt that there is much more to be gained from pursuing the sanctions route quite so determinedly as others still feel inclined. A measure of sound common sense was brought to the debate in June this year when US Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asia and the Pacific Eric John said in an interview (‘The Irrawaddy June 2006): “Of course, we don’t think that sanctions - just from economics alone - are going to change the Burmese leadership, but politically it is an important signal……Sanctions have a symbolic meaning. I mean, we kind of set aside the sanctions discussion because in the next couple of years we are not going to get China to sanction Burma, that’s not a realistic goal.”
In a situation where not only China, but all of Burma’s immediate neighbours, as well as countries further afield like Russia, Pakistan, South Korea, Japan, Australia and Israel, irritated though they may well be with the junta’s intransigence, have make it clear that they have no intention of following the US and EU lead on sanctions, Voices for Burma feel that the sanctions debate has now rather played itself out. Those sanctions which have been applied might as well stay, and in any case there is no likelihood of them being removed in the near future. Now that Burma is enjoying, rather unexpectedly, a bonanza from the increase in world energy prices through an additional US$ 1 billion annually from sales of natural gas to Thailand, the deleterious effects of US and EU sanctions have effectively been cancelled out.
In short, Voices for Burma believe that, on the sanctions issue, a stalemate has been reached. Western Governments feel the need to make a strong political statement, but thanks to natural gas exports and EU humanitarian programmes, the population is not made to suffer unnecessarily. Between proponents of increased sanctions and those who believe that the revitalisation of the economy could create the conditions for political reform in Burma, there is little common ground. Voices for Burma accordingly prefer to maintain a neutral position in the debate, while respecting both those who feel that sanctions have not gone far enough, and those who feel they have gone too far already.
Voices for Burma nonetheless welcomes debate and discussion on this controversial issue.
US sanctions, which have long included an arms embargo, were reaffirmed in 1997 under the Clinton administration and reinforced in 2003 under the Bush administration. The 2003 measures were renewed in 2006, and include a ban on new investment, a suspension of all Burmese imports to the US, restrictions on the use of the US Dollar as well as an asset freeze and visa ban on junta personnel. These measures enjoy strong bipartisan support in both Houses of Congress. There is no likelihood that they will be revoked any time soon, and they could even be strengthened.
EU sanctions are based on a “Common Position” worked out among the 25 EU member countries. They are more selective than US sanctions, and include an arms embargo, a visa ban and asset freeze similar to US measures, a limited investment ban on selected military-controlled enterprises, and denial of the General System of Preferences (GSP) available generally to 49 designated developing countries. EU sanctions are a necessary compromise between those who favour more stick than carrot, and those who wish to promote critical dialogue. As with the US, there is no likelihood that the EU “Common Position” will change any time soon.
Both the US and EU are opposed to the provision of funding for Burma from international financial institutions (IFIs) like the Asian Development Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the Asian Development Bank, though these institutions maintain a dialogue with the regime and recommend structural reforms to the ailing economy, notably a resolution of the multiple-exchange rate system, less Government intervention and greater control of corruption. However, without authority to provide refinancing and resources for structural reform, the IFIs cannot act and the economy continues to flounder.
Effectiveness of Sanctions
There is no evidence that, since sanctions were first applied in the aftermath of the uprising of 8 August 1988, they have had any measurable effect in influencing the regime to introduce serious political reform. There is some evidence that, on isolated occasions, they have induced the authorities to release this or that individual, or to make this or that minor concession, but as sanctions have been slowly ratcheted up, the regime has become more hard-line and more recalcitrant and less inclined to pay any intention to international concerns. US sanctions have undoubtedly inflicted some punishment on the economy generally, and though in the countryside the population has not been seriously affected, their living standards remain static as the regime takes resources from social welfare programmes, health and education to meet what is seen as the Western threat.
Western Governments, however, need to respond to domestic pressures from campaigning groups who demand that something should be done about human rights abuses. Sanctions express our moral outrage at the situation in Burma, send a strong message of support for Aung San Suu Kyi and the hundreds of political prisoners in Burma and ensure that their plight is not forgotten.
Our Policy
Voices for Burma fully support these sentiments, but doubt that there is much more to be gained from pursuing the sanctions route quite so determinedly as others still feel inclined. A measure of sound common sense was brought to the debate in June this year when US Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asia and the Pacific Eric John said in an interview (‘The Irrawaddy June 2006): “Of course, we don’t think that sanctions - just from economics alone - are going to change the Burmese leadership, but politically it is an important signal……Sanctions have a symbolic meaning. I mean, we kind of set aside the sanctions discussion because in the next couple of years we are not going to get China to sanction Burma, that’s not a realistic goal.”
In a situation where not only China, but all of Burma’s immediate neighbours, as well as countries further afield like Russia, Pakistan, South Korea, Japan, Australia and Israel, irritated though they may well be with the junta’s intransigence, have make it clear that they have no intention of following the US and EU lead on sanctions, Voices for Burma feel that the sanctions debate has now rather played itself out. Those sanctions which have been applied might as well stay, and in any case there is no likelihood of them being removed in the near future. Now that Burma is enjoying, rather unexpectedly, a bonanza from the increase in world energy prices through an additional US$ 1 billion annually from sales of natural gas to Thailand, the deleterious effects of US and EU sanctions have effectively been cancelled out.
In short, Voices for Burma believe that, on the sanctions issue, a stalemate has been reached. Western Governments feel the need to make a strong political statement, but thanks to natural gas exports and EU humanitarian programmes, the population is not made to suffer unnecessarily. Between proponents of increased sanctions and those who believe that the revitalisation of the economy could create the conditions for political reform in Burma, there is little common ground. Voices for Burma accordingly prefer to maintain a neutral position in the debate, while respecting both those who feel that sanctions have not gone far enough, and those who feel they have gone too far already.
Voices for Burma nonetheless welcomes debate and discussion on this controversial issue.