“Sanctions against Burma have been an utter failure. Indeed, they may quite possibly have been worse than a failure. In attempting to put pressure on the regime, they may have made it even more recalcitrant….…… Sanctions may appear a strong response, but do they work? All the evidence on Burma says no.”

Lord Wakeham, House of Lords, 12 October 2007

UN Security Council Presidential Statement

The importance of the Presidential Statement issued by the UN Security Council on 11 October 2007[1] has been highlighted in most capital cities around the world. I quote by choice the comment of the French Foreign Ministry Spokesman on 12 October who expressed quiet satisfaction with what has been achieved and noted that “by this declaration the international community is addressing to the Burmese junta a message of unity and vigilance as regards the evolution of the situation.”  A balanced assessment, which seeks to avoid confrontation. The British Prime Minister applauded the leadership and responsibility shown by the Security Council in issuing  their first ever formal statement on Myanmar and thought it essential “that we continue to work to bring an end to this crisis.” In Myanmar , however, there are no signs that they believe that there is a continuing crisis or that anything needs to change. The US would like Mr Gambari, the UN Secretary General’s Special Representative on Myanmar , to return to the country as soon as possible. Mr Gambari looks likely to wish to complete a regional tour first. The hawks may need to contain their impatience yet awhile.

China and Russia on side, at least for the present

The Russian and Chinese positions merit particular attention. Russia is hardly in the firing line in quite the way that China is, and its approach has been calculated, even steely. “With regard to the Security Council” said Ambassador Churkin in his statement on 5 October 2007 at the Council’s 5753^rd meeting “its job is to continue lending political support to the efforts of Mr Gambari, who received an appropriate mandate from the General Assembly.” Russia no doubt remains of the view that “The Situation in Myanmar” ought not to be on the agenda of the Council at all, but as the agenda item cannot be wished away, the limits of the Council’s responsibilities as seen by Russia have been spelled out very clearly - political support for Mr Gambari, but nothing more. Mr Churkin pointedly avoided any “stakeout” comment to the press after the Council meetings on both 5 and 11 October. His message, in British royal parlance, was: “We are not amused.”

As for China , it is evident that they are feeling the heat, but as the 17^th Congress of the Communist Party of China opened in Beijing yesterday, are unlikely to be in a mood to make concessions. Yet in agreeing eventually as Russia did to the text of the Presidential Statement, China too has recognised that the Council has a responsibility, though in his “stakeout” on 5 October, Ambassador Wang would go no further than to say that “the Council can play a role to help”. In his Council statement, Ambassador Wang made clear China ’s opposition to pressure which “would not serve any purpose and would only lead to confrontation or even the loss of dialogue and cooperation between Myanmar and the international community, including the United Nations”.

But differences remain

It is on the question of continuing pressures that differences remain among the Five Permanent Council Members. “We respectfully differ” US Ambassador Khalilzad told the press in his 5 October “stakeout”. “We believe that engagement, which they [ China ] support, that is to continue. But for engagement to be productive in our view, pressure has to be also applied, to incentivize the regime to cooperate. And the two are complementary rather than the view expressed that they are in conflict or in tension with each other.”  That too is the British position, particularly of Prime Minister Gordon Brown. But I suspect that the US and British positions are dictated more by domestic political preoccupations, the need felt to respond to the sense of outrage felt in both Britain and the US to recent events, rather than to any cool, professional assessment of the risks involved in a pressurized, even confrontational approach. Invited to speak as current Chairman of the Association of South East Asian Nations, Singapore ’s UN Ambassador Menon told the Council that “we have to pause to consider dispassionately what the real impact of additional sanctions will be. How will they affect a regime that is only tangentially connected to the rest of the world? Will they help or hinder the role of the United Nations? How will they affect the willingness of the SPDC to cooperate with Mr Gambari? What is their impact on the people of Myanmar ?”

Sensible questions indeed, but alas there was never any prospect of a dispassionate analysis by the EU prior to their announcement of further sanctions on 15 October[2]. Indeed, at no stage in the long saga of sanctions since they were first imposed on Myanmar ten years ago has there ever been any assessment released to the European Parliament or to the European public of the impact of sanctions and of their success in achieving their declared objectives, no doubt for the simple reason that the results, reportedly assessed in an internal review, have been so unpromising that common sense would argue for their curtailment if not abandonment. But where passions dominate, common sense flies out of the window, and if the junta in Myanmar is made even more recalcitrant and the people suffer, the pretence of “targeted sanctions” is likely to persist. That the impact of such sanctions on the regime might simply be passed on to the hapless Burmese people is seemingly not something that Western Governments might wish to contemplate.

US policy is showing nonetheless signs of a refreshing realism

US Ambassador at the UN Zalmay Khalilzad is warming to his Burmese portfolio and in his comments on recent events has shown an understanding of issues on the ground in Myanmar far greater than his predecessor John Bolton who at times seemed to be interested only in confrontation. At his “stakeout” on 9 October 2007, while stressing those issues to which the US attached particular importance, he acknowledged that: “The military as an institution has its role to play in the transition and post-transition.” The Ambassador has to cope with First Lady Laura Bush’s interventions who has said that Myanmar “has only days to act” before her husband’s administration ordered fresh sanctions. In everything that Ambassador Khalilzad, who hails from Afghanistan , has said you sense the experience of a diplomat who understands the importance of what happens on the ground, reflecting particularly his recent experience in Iraq .

In this he is ably supported by the present US Chargé in Rangoon , Sheri Villarosa, whose incisive comments on recent events in Myanmar , like those of British Ambassador Mark Canning, have gone around the world. Intelligent too are the remarks by one of her predecessors, Priscilla Clapp (1999-2002) who commented on 11 October that: “It would be extremely difficult to have any kind of transition that did not include the military. Some members must remain because they have a major role in the last 45 years in holding Burma together. Any transition has to include them, with the hope that the turnover will produce leaders who are more enlightened.” It is refreshing to hear US views which are more nuanced than the advocates of regime change which dominate opinion in Congress.

Side currents

In the current dynamic situation, the military government has regretted that the Security Council issued its Presidential Statement and has by way of response reasserted the importance of the Seven-Stage Constitutional Road Map. This expression of regret was the minimum to be expected. Rallies have been held nation-wide to support Government policy.  Although the British Foreign Secretary David Miliband has welcomed “Professor Gambari’s clear statement on 5 October that the status quo ante was both unacceptable and unsustainable”, there is no sign yet that Myanmar ’s military leaders either understand or accept this, and I would not like to take any bets that they ever will. But for once there is a lot of strong criticism from ASEAN, whose Foreign Ministers expressed their “revulsion” at recent events in a Joint Statement in New York on 27 September. Singapore ’s elder statesman Lee Kuan Yew told US media academics: “These are rather dumb generals when it comes to the economy”, adding that the rulers must have pushed “a hungry and impoverished people to revolt.” Lee also commented that “an unstable Myanmar is a time bomb for the whole region……..so it is in the best interests of every country in ASEAN to help stabilise Myanmar .”

For those who have the time, it is well worth listening to video “stakeout” interviews with Security Council Ambassadors[3]. The formal statements in the Council are invariably carefully crafted, but what Ambassadors say informally when cornered by the waiting media in UN Headquarters (hence “stakeout”) is often more revealing than what they say in the Council Chamber.  My own private game is to see which representatives use “ Burma ” and which use “ Myanmar ”. I would say that “ Myanmar ” is proving very contagious. Though the French representative used only “Birmanie” in the Council Chamber on 5 October, in his “stakeout” he used only “ Myanmar ”. It should have been the other way round, because I would think it difficult to discuss an agreed agenda item “The Situation in Myanmar ” by referring all the time to another country “ Burma ”. Indeed, international protocol and practice requires the usage only of the name “ Myanmar ” for the State, whatever popular name might be given to the country outside the Council Chamber. The UK representative, Sir John Sawers, likewise reverted in his “stakeout” on 11 October to “ Myanmar ” on three occasions, the last time correcting himself to “ Burma ” to conform to what may be UK Government policy.

A curious reference on the Foreign and Commonwealth web-site on 11 October to the first meeting of a UN chaired “Core Group on Burma ” disappeared overnight. By 15 October the British Prime Minister had informed the world[4] that he was that day writing to the G7, the UN Secretary-General, the Prime Ministers of Portugal, India and China , the President of the World Bank and the Managing Director of the IMF proposing an economic recovery plan conditional on progress on reconciliation and democracy. At long last, is something really about to happen, or is it still just rhetoric? No one though should doubt Gordon Brown’s total commitment. Myanmar at long last has secured the priority in terms of political attention which has so long been lacking.

EU interdiction of trade in commodities for which there is an insatiable demand

Speaking in the House of Lords on 12 October, Lord Hannay, formerly our Ambassador at the UN, asked why on earth General Than Shwe should have called on Daw Aung San Suu Kyi to give up her support for sanctions if he thought they were totally irrelevant. A good question, perhaps, if you know little about the mind-set of the Burmese Generals. But there is a simple explanation, and it is that in appealing to The Lady yet again to give up her support for sanctions, this time in return for a meeting, he was in fact calling on her to abandon what he described as her attitude of “Confrontation, Utter Devastation and Imposing all Kinds of Sanctions including Economic Sanctions against Myanmar.” As Burma watchers know, this is the umpteenth time that the SPDC has assailed Daw Aung San Suu Kyi on these various counts. To my mind the charges highlight not so much the impact which sanctions might supposedly be making as General Than Shwe’s total opposition to everything that Daw Aung San Suu Kyi stands for. An article in The New Light of Myanmar  on 14 October noted that: “Economic sanctions against Myanmar have adverse effects on the people, rather than on the Government. Myanmar people now have hard times owing to economic sanctions imposed on her.” Minister of State Lord Malloch-Brown was nonetheless convinced by the end of the debate (on the Report of the Economic Affairs Committee on The Impact of Economic Sanctions) that both the regime and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi “believe that this call for sanctions has a real impact”. I can only guess at how he would know this, when The Lady has been held incommunicado for the past four years and her current views on sanctions, for which she has never in fact called, but which she has in the past supported, are known only perhaps to Mr Gambari. Warming to his theme, the Minister of State saw the new EU sanctions as “just the first step in the process which needs to broaden this to include Asian economic partners of Burma as well.”[5] Disobligingly, Thai, Malaysian and Singapore leaders have confirmed yet again that sanctions are not the answer. China , India and Russia are likewise of this same view. However the remote hope that they might just one day be persuaded to change their minds seems to provide British Ministers with the excuse to persist with them. Did Singapore ’s UN Ambassador Menon, after all, not tell the Security Council on 5 October that: “Indeed, we should not rule that out”?

US$ 2.16 billion annual bonanza from natural gas exports

The annual bonanza of US$ 2.16 billion, or 43% of foreign exchange earnings during the Fiscal Year ended 31 March 2007, an amount which the junta could reasonably expect to earn from natural gas exports for the next 25 years, significantly mitigates the effects of the  further restrictive measures announced on 15 October by the EU. The exclusion of what in FY 2006 amounted to Euro 48 million (US$ 68 million) of wood and wood product exports from the European market will cause not a ripple of concern in Nay Pyi Taw, for China’s 200,000 sawmills, replete with timber from Papua New Guinea, Indonesia and Myanmar, will process every single log sent their way, provided their Thai competitors do not get there first. Indeed, to the extent that China and Myanmar have agreed to seek to conserve Burmese forests and to reduce illegal logging, the EU’s restrictive measures on timber might even be quietly welcomed by both countries. As for  gems and precious stones, the Euro 8 million (US$ 11 million) recorded trade in FY 2006 probably underestimates the true amount, but the next six-monthly auction postponed until November should give a good indication of whether the exclusion of the European market has had any impact at all. If China now takes over the legal trade instead of just dominating the illegal trade, tant pis for the EU.  As regards precious metals, I have scoured EU trade statistics in an attempt to identify EU imports of these from Myanmar (antimony, copper, silver, gold, tungsten, tin, nickel), but have concluded that they are either non-existent or negligible.[6] The latest EU measures also ban (no doubt to the delight of our Asian competitors) the export of equipment in the sectors of timber and mining for metals and precious stones and also ban EU investment in the same sectors, which as it happens is unusually difficult under Burmese law and may only be arranged through Joint Ventures with State-owned enterprises. There are currently no EU investments of which I am aware in these sectors, and our Asian competitors will be pleased that we have now given them an open field in sectors where in any case they previously had a virtual monopoly.

The extent then to which the latest measures will put pressure through targeting what Lord Malloch-Brown rightly described as “particularly profitable parts of Burma ’s economy” in order “to initiate an inclusive process of reconciliation” must be close to zero. There is in any case an insatiable demand for these commodities which are a happy hunting ground for rogue traders. Whether the fine print of the relevant EU legislation will seek to restrict the import of commodities processed in other countries, often - apart from Burmese rubies and some other precious stones - beyond recognition as to country of origin, remains to be seen. Even the Minister of State was moved to agree with the Lord Howell of Guildford that “without ASEAN, China , India and Japan being part of an international sanctions regime imposed through the UN Security Council, the effect will be limited.”

Along with the latest US sanctions, which specifically target 14 senior members of the ruling junta and their families already fully sanctioned by the 2003 Burma Freedom and Democracy Act and which were introduced even before the first fatality was reported during the recent disturbances, the EU measures should fortunately have little or no effect in destabilising the economy, but they will ensure that the US and hawks in the EU will have little or no influence on Myanmar’s transition from a military regime through power-sharing to eventual civilian rule. But the less than hawkish Nicholas Sarkozy is bound for South East Asia soon and his Minister for Human Rights, Mme Rama(toulaye) Yade(-Zimet) who hails from Senegal, has applied for a visa to visit Myanmar. India too has made its move. There are persistent reports that the Indian Ambassador in Rangoon , Bhaskar Mitra, who is a senior diplomat of long-standing, met Daw Aung San Suu Kyi recently, possibly even before Mr Gambari visited, to press the Indian case, or rather Indian interests, perhaps even to offer her asylum in India .  Not to be outdone, the British Prime Minister, who wrote a chapter on Daw Aung San Suu Kyi published earlier this year in his book “Eight Portraits” (available from Amazon UK), has hinted that he too would go, if there were good enough reason.  For the present, though, in the words of George Yeo, the Singapore Foreign Minister, Mr Gambari, a gifted diplomat who has somehow managed to earn the trust of both sides, “is our best bet and the only game in town.”

On balance then, I would congratulate EU Ministers in agreeing restrictive measures which are the minimum which is politically acceptable in Europe . But let us not delude ourselves into thinking that they exert any serious pressure on the junta to change its ways. They are only likely make them more recalcitrant and undermine the commendable, indeed remarkable consensus recently agreed in the Security Council.

Derek Tonkin

UK Diplomatic Service 1952-89